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Sir,
The originality of  the organization called “Islamic State” is 
that it is quite different in its mode of  operation from all the 
other jihadist movements, including the Al-Qaida. Its use 
of  terror is particularly spectacular and meant to affect the 
public, horror is not hidden but is part of  their propaganda, 
just like terror is meant to paralyze. The following examines 
the rise and decline of  this organization.
How do you explain the birth of  the Islamic State 
Organization?
The core of  the organization is an indirect creation of  the 
American intervention in Iraq in 2003. This latest clumsily 
and systematically marginalizes the Sunnis, who as early as 
July 2003 rebel and benefited of  the organizations of  a state 
whose structures have not been broken - special services, 
republican guard, and fedayeen. Soon after the insurgency 
of  Fallujah and the sexual scandal of  Abu Ghraib Prison 
(2004), the Sunnis will be joined by radical Islamists led by the 
Jordanian Abu Musab al-Zarqawi. The Ba’ath and Saddam’s 
followers are coopted in radical Islamism, more mobilizing.
What has allowed the organization to grow?
After the death of  al-Zarqawi caused by the Americans (2006), 
Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi gradually imposes itself. Nothing is 
solved in 2011 when US troops leave Iraq. Terrorist actions 
go on. What journalists have named the Arab Spring is an 
opportunity for the Islamic State of  Iraq to make a move to 
Syria. The opening is made by al-Julani who organizes the 
sympathizers in the country. The proximity of  the Turkish 
border, which allows the passage of  Jihad volunteers and 
profitable oil traffic, will later bring the troops of  al-Baghdadi 
to Syria. Talks are held between al-Baghdadi and al-Qaeda, 
and a temporary alliance is built between the two movements. 
In 2013, al-Baghdadi will break it, considering his movement 
more radical. The organization of  Al-Baghdadi invests Raqqa, 
becoming the capital on the Euphrates - at a good distance 
from the coast held by the regime - and soon proclaims the 
Islamic State of  Iraq and al-Sham. The movement receives 
concrete support and funds from the Gulf  - Kuwait, Saudi 
Arabia, United Arab Emirates - and Turkey. Volunteers flock 
and pass freely through the Turkish border.
In 2014, al-Baghdadi decided to return to Iraq with well-
trained, disciplined, and highly indoctrinated troops. 
Paradoxically, Mosul, the second city of  Iraq, collapses 
almost without a fight. In their flight, Iraqi troops left 
important equipment and finances. The fall of  Mosul brings 
an extraordinary aura to the movement. Taking advantage of  
the boon, Abu Bakr al-Baghdadi proclaims himself  caliph and 
announces that the border erected by the European imperial 
powers between Syria and Iraq no longer exists. Soon after, 
his troops invest the Sinjar where they will massacre the 
Yazidis and reduce women into sexual slaves while crucifying 
Christians. They, thus, gain a reputation of  extreme ferocity 
while unexpectedly they penetrate in the Kurdish region. 
Al-Baghdadi’s troops reach Gwer and Makhmur, 40 km away 
from Erbil, the capital. On August 8, the phone call given 
by the Kurdish leadership to obtain US aid allows in record 
time the US aviation to stop net the advance of  thousands 
of  jihadists.
From there, the conflict comes much more static; the 
Kurds try to hold a front of  nearly a 1000 km, thanks to the 
sophisticated armament provided by Germany and other 
European allies. In Syria, Kurds who occupy a very large 
part of  the Syrian Turkish border organize themselves. They 
manage to fight Daesh heroically in Kobane, thus bringing 
American aid that will allow them to be used as proxy forces.
What made it possible to defeat the Islamic State organization?
The Islamic State organization was defeated first by the de 
facto alliance between the United States and its allies, militias 
in Syria, and to a lesser extent in Iraq, both organized by Iran. 
The severe bombardments inflicted from summer 2015 to 
spring 2016 by Russia also impacted them heavily. Finally, it 
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was by land assaults, first by Iraqi forces and Kurds of  Iraq 
against Mosul, later by the offensive mainly conducted by the 
Kurds of  Rojava on Raqqa, the capital of  the movement. The 
jihadists fought with a lot of  determination in both Mosul 
and Raqqa and were defeated because Calif  had officially 
territorialized the essentially desert area they controlled.
If  the systematic use of  terror using techniques already used 
by the Mongols has been shown to pay off  to paralyze the 
adversary, territorializing has proved to be a trap. When one 
is a guerrilla, it should not pretend to territorialized what it 
has liberated (The Vietnamese never pretended to control 
their territory, the ground was controlled by day by the 
French or the Americans, and the population was controlled 
at night by the Vietnamese). When a guerilla pretends to 
control territory, it can do it with a weak adversary unable 
to direct ground confrontation. When reorganized Iraqi 
troops and Syrian Kurdish forces well equipped were ready 
to fight on the ground offensively against Daesh, it was 
not possible for the Islamists to resist the combination of  
ground forces with tanks, heavy weapons, and air force. 
Al-Baghdadi, achieved a tour de force, exceeding his means. 
He isolated himself, defying all his opponents including 
Jihadists organizations as well as states that contributed to 
his rise. To end with a note of  humor, if  Iranians Shiaism 
has a hidden Imam, now, Sunni jihadists in the Daesh version 
have a hidden caliph.
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